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Abstract
In this article, we explore the relationship between public recreation policy and planning and the transformation of urban
governance in the context of the Police Athletic League centers in Baltimore, Maryland. In light of contemporary discus-
sions of the role of youth programs for sport and physical activitywithin post-industrial cities, the origination, development,
and eventual demise of Baltimore’s network of Police Activity League centers is an instructive, if disheartening, saga. It il-
lustrates the social and political rationales mobilized in justifying recreation policy and programming, the framing of sport
and physical activity as preventativemeasures towards crime and juvenile delinquency, and the precarity of such initiatives
given the efficiency-driven orthodoxies of neoliberal urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989). This analysis emphasizes
how the PAL centers were designed to ‘fill the void’ left by a declining system of public recreation, thereby providing an
example of a recreation program as part of the “social problems industry” (Pitter & Andrews 1997).
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1. Introduction
In May 1996, officials from different agencies and
departments—including the Mayor’s Office, the city’s
department of recreation and parks, and the police
department—gathered to announce the latest develop-
ment in the restructuring of Baltimore’s public recreation
centers: the opening of several Police Athletic League
centers (PALs). Over the previous 40 years, the city had
invested both capital and programming funds towards
an extensive network of centers operated by the public
recreation department. However, the PALs program of-
fered a different model of recreation: uncoupled from
the previous approach to urban recreation based on
publicly-derived funding and support, the PALs were de-
livered utilizing a public-private partnership model of
governance. In this mode, urban communities became
evermore underserved in regard to decreased public
recreation programs and facilities. As such, recreation
provision became one of myriad expressions of race and
class inequality, created by neoliberal processes of devo-
lution and privatization within U.S. cities. In this article,
the authors demonstrate that the PAL program should
be understood as a particular form of neoliberal inter-
vention within urban communities, one that has had spe-
cific impacts for the policy and planning of recreation in
Baltimore. The authors therefore adopt a contextual ap-
proach to studying urban governance via the “articula-
tion” (Slack, 1996) of policy and planning through various
political, economic, and social forces. This approach uti-
lizes a critical discourse analysis of over 500 documents
related to the Baltimore PAL program, including official
meeting minutes, planning and organizational documen-
tation, and annual and long-term reports from the city’s
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recreation department, as well as other sources of recre-
ation discourse: community organization flyers, recre-
ation programming forms, and media reports.
Rather than focusing on the provision of recreation
experiences and opportunities as a means of enriching
lives, the underlying assumptions behind the PAL pro-
gram mobilized recreation as a vehicle for intervening
into, and thereby looking to manage, the lives and bod-
ies of those always already perceived to be “at-risk” (not
only to themselves but, more importantly, to the wider
Baltimore population living within a climate of histori-
cally entrenched racialized fears and anxieties). In this
mode, Baltimore’s PAL program demonstrates one ex-
ample of sports-based interventions that are designed
to change individual behaviors, urban spaces, and so-
cial interactions between communities and policing or-
ganizations (Kelly, 2013), particularly in regard to “hard
to reach” (Crabbe, 2007) populations within cities. Fur-
ther, the PALs were also a “microcosm of American lib-
eral social policy” (Hartmann, 2016, p. 73), since their
very development, and ultimate demise, was inextrica-
bly linked to the shifting conditions and dynamics of
neoliberal urban governance. Originated as an innova-
tive public-private alternative to the perceived ineffi-
ciencies of the publicly-funded recreational model, the
inevitable fiscal crises that punctuate neoliberalism’s
modus operandi–and create legitimizing states of excep-
tion (Ong, 2006)—precipitated the inevitable disman-
tling of the PALs program as the neoliberal urban project
revealed its inherent unsustainability in the early 2000s.
Driven by the fear-mongering and self-interest driven
logics of what Edsall (2012) dubbed the “age of auster-
ity”, exponents of neoliberal urban governance orthodox-
ies were pathologically compelled to trim the excesses
of public service provision and programming. Following
Spaaij (2009), neoliberal sport-based intervention pro-
grams therefore have often included the potential for
social cohesion and individual opportunity, but are si-
multaneously “aimed at generating social order in disad-
vantaged inner-city neighbourhoods” both in the United
States and Europe (p. 252).
Although this article is focused on Baltimore’s Police
Athletic League program, it would be remiss not to pro-
vide a brief contextualization of the PAL more generally.
The roots of the PAL can be traced to the reformist pa-
ternalism of the early-1900s, specifically various initia-
tives by the New York Police which sought to use var-
ious forms of recreation to encourage good citizenship
among the city’s mass ranks of impoverished youth, and
nurture a positive relationship between this group and
theNewYork Police Department (PAL, 2015). By the early
1930s, the social and economic turmoil created by the
Depression—and most pertinently the perceived threat
of rising rates of juvenile delinquency—intensified the fo-
cus on youth recreation programs as a mechanism for
crime prevention. Hence, the NYPD Crime Prevention Bu-
reau formed the Junior Police Athletic League in 1932,
which was reorganized into the Police Athletic League in
1936 (PAL, 2015). From its early twentieth century New
York City origins, PAL programs have spread throughout
the U.S., oftentimes shifting programmatic structure and
focus as dictated by changing urban realities, and asso-
ciated policy priorities (i.e. the War on Poverty in the
1960s, the War on Drugs in the 1980s, the War on Ter-
ror in the 2000s, and theWar on Obesity in the 2010s).
Nonetheless, and belying the residual influence of its
socially reformist beginnings, the PAL program at its in-
stitutional core movement continues to mobilize physi-
cal recreation (play, games, and sport) as a vehicle for
building positive character traits. The program there-
fores utilizes recreation as a means for the adoption of
values which would, it is assumed, assimilate potentially
deviant poor urban youth into the social mainstream
(Wilson, 1994). PALs today are a vivid institutional ex-
emplar of what Pitter and Andrews (1997) referred to
as the “social problems industry”: a complex and di-
verse formation of publicly and privately-funded, for-
profit and not-for-profit, recreation-based crime preven-
tion and public safety programs designed to “serve”—or
perhaps more accurately regulate, discipline, or police—
America’s historically underserved urban poor. Within
the contemporary social problems industry context, “at-
risk urban youth” is a racialized euphemism for demo-
nized Black bodies and characteristics, whose patholo-
gized deviance renders them as being “at-risk” to them-
selves, to their communities, and–inflaming more polit-
ical purchase—to mainstream (read: White) American
society more generally (Cole, 1996). Programs within
more affluent suburban metropolitan spaces tend to
be justified through their provision of physical recre-
ation experiences–and anticipated physical, psycholog-
ical, and social benefits–to suburban (read: deserving)
youth (Pitter & Andrews, 1997).
While doubtless realizing many of these outcomes,
programs such as the PALs explicitly targeting the prob-
lematized urban poor are never far removed from what
populist conservative thinking considers to be such pro-
gram’s raison d’être: using physical recreation interven-
tions as means of “controlling and/or containing pop-
ulations…seen as either ‘at-risk’ or socially disruptive”
(Hartmann, 2012, p. 1011). However, while its disciplin-
ing logic has been unwavering, the very structure and
delivery of the various components of the social prob-
lems industry is contingent upon the shifting ideologies
and policies of urban governance. Hence, as we demon-
strate within this discussion, Baltimore’s PAL centers ul-
timately became soldiers of fortune to the mode of ne-
oliberal urban entrepreneurialism that increasingly dom-
inated the governance of U.S. cities, such as Baltimore,
from the 1980s onwards (Harvey, 1989). Below we de-
tail the emergence of the social problems industry and
the relationship between recreation and social inclusion
in the late 20th century, before analyzing the scale and
scope of the PAL programas a particular formof interven-
tion that had specific impacts on recreation policy and
planning in Baltimore.
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2. Recreation, Social Inclusion and the ‘Social Problems
Industry’
By the early 1960s the postwar economic surge in the
U.S. had largely come to a halt, resulting in a growing
social inequality within many American cities, as real-
ized through economically-driven racial segregation and
the “white flight” of suburbanization (Harrington, 1962).
In this context, the inner city increasingly referred not
only to the core of the city, but also to the minority and
predominately black populations inhabiting urban spaces
challenged by the intensifying struggles of joblessness, de-
caying infrastructure, and criminality (Sugrue, 1996). As
Corburn suggests, the 1960s thus signaled the advent of
the ‘urban crisis’ within American politics, policy and plan-
ning, as cities were commonly viewed as the locus of so-
cial problems linked to economic inequality and racial and
ethnic divisions (2009, p. 54). Recreation spaces, facilities
and programs were also included in this policy and re-
search focus on urban America, as evidenced by the grow-
ing disparities in the amount and condition of facilities
and programming between different areas of the city and
suburbs. In this context, the “inner city” increasingly re-
ferred not only to the core of the city but also to theminor-
ity and predominately black populations of these areas—
and the struggles of joblessness, decaying infrastructure
and the stigmatization of the urban underclass were dis-
proportionately endured by these populations (Sugrue,
1996). Further, recreation became an increasingly crucial
aspect in terms of serving as a progressivemeans of build-
ing community, and improving the quality of life in urban
neighborhoods, leading to an “era of growth” for public
recreation in Baltimore and other American cities in terms
of funding, programming, and facilities (Deppe, 1986).
However, this era was followed by larger shifts in
the politics and modes of governance of American cities,
and these shifts were to have particular and important
effects on the formation and implementation of urban
recreation policy, and within the operation of city recre-
ation departments. As Biles (2011, p. 202) explains, the
processes of federal and state “disinvestment” in urban
centers meant that by the late 1970s and into the 1980s,
many American cities and their citizens were essentially
left to “fend for themselves” in comparison to the peak
of social services funding and programming, especially
in regard to federal programs and policies. The changes
to these rationales resulted in Baltimore’s recreation sys-
tem being reconstructed with unprecedented financial
and political support, but also left this same system in
a state of nearly permanent struggle in regard to op-
erations, staffing and maintenance once this support
had waned. In short, the 1970s signaled the “high-water
mark”, or period of peak support and implementation,
and subsequent gradual decline of public recreation as
an essential social service for citizens of Baltimore and
other American cities.
Following Harvey (1989), the shifts within the gover-
nance of Baltimore during the 1970s evidence a larger
transformation in the methods and ideologies of Amer-
ican urban governance, specifically in the differing ap-
proaches towards operating and administrating city ser-
vices signaled by a shift from “urban managerialism” to
“urban entrepreneurialism”. Intertwined with the pro-
cesses of deindustrialization and suburbanization that
changed the city’ s population level, economic poten-
tial and demographic makeup, Harvey’s (1989) analysis
marks the transition away from the “managerial” Key-
nesian model of social service provision via public fund-
ing and support, and toward “entrepreneurial” strategies
centered on inter-urban competition for tourism and
consumption, often driven by attempts to re-imagine
specific areas of the city as hubs of capital growth and
economic redevelopment. In Baltimore, this reorienta-
tion of the aims and models of urban governance was
constituted primarily through the renewed emphases
on economic redevelopment projects, and the concur-
rent de-prioritization and reduction of public services,
including recreation. Thus, on the one hand, Baltimore
engaged in the processes of privatization and public-
private partnerships in order to complete tourist-focused
projects such as the Inner Harbor, professional baseball
(Camden Yards) and football (M& T Bank Stadium) stadia
projects, and Baltimore Convention Center, among oth-
ers, as part of a “renaissance” strategy that aimed to pro-
mote the city’s downtown area as a center of consump-
tion and entertainment (Harvey, 2001). On the other
hand, this focus on downtown development occurred si-
multaneously with the retrenchment of social services
and decline in population and housing for many of the
city’s neighborhoods. By the late 1990s, these processes
had constituted the formation of what Levine (2000)
recognized as the ‘three Baltimores’ of 1) the suburbs,
2) downtown and the Inner Harbor, and 3) the multitude
of underserved neighborhoods, as the city and region
were increasingly characterized by both racial and class
inequalities and different realities in regards to economic
and social opportunity (p. 140).
Meanwhile as Deppe (1986) explains, in many Amer-
ican cities by the mid-1980s “recreation as an end to it-
self was totally unsalable” in regards to local, state, and
federal government policies (p. 34). In part, this was due
to the severe changes in demographics for many dein-
dustrializing cities like Baltimore, as urban populations
were increasingly characterized by economic and social
disparities. The impacts of suburbanization, especially
in regard to social stratification along racial and classed
lines, reshaped Baltimore as a post-industrial city that
was losing both economic opportunities and parts of its
population at the same time that federal and state gov-
ernments disassembled social service policies and pro-
grams (Durr, 2003; Levine, 2000). This meant that as
many American urban centers were increasingly charac-
terized by “a deteriorated economy, an inability to pro-
vide needed services, political indifference from state
and federal authorities, and a forecast of increasing con-
centration of local poverty,” recreation programs and
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funding were increasingly less a priority, and more a per-
sistent thorn in the side of municipal governments faced
by other seemingly more pressing issues (Shivers, 1981,
p. 44). An efficiency-driven entrepreneurial approach to
public recreation would also develop within this era, as
the city worked to support existing and potential new
partnerships in relation to special facilities, while also at-
tempting to sustain a decreasing number of often inad-
equately staffed and poorly maintained neighborhood-
based facilities.
As primary aspects of the formation of public recre-
ation governance in this period, the partnership model
and necessity of a solution for the declining system of
neighborhood-based recreation facilities converged in
the form of an effort at restructuring the department,
and the general administration and provision of recre-
ation services in Baltimore. This resulted in the reinven-
tion and expansion of PAL recreation centers, which uti-
lized the neighborhood-based model of recreation fa-
cilities but were staffed and programmed by city po-
lice officers rather than public recreation personnel. The
PALs program had been operating in other cities, includ-
ing New York and Philadelphia, for several decades be-
fore being implemented in Baltimore, and while Balti-
more’s police had previously had limited youth-directed
programming, it wasn’t until 1995 that the PALs pro-
gram was officially developed and implemented in the
city, in part as the personal project of police Commis-
sioner Thomas Frazier ( “Police fill rec center void”, 1996).
Specifically, the PALs initiativewas a response to the “link
between juvenile delinquency and inadequate youth pro-
grams” in many of Baltimore’s communities, especially
in the context of the “glaring inadequacy of city recre-
ation centers in some neighborhoods that need them
most” (“Police fill rec center void”, 1996). These devel-
opments reflect the impact of neoliberal urban gover-
nance on black communities in Baltimore, as many of
the neighborhoods in which the first 10 PAL centers had
been organized were already facing issues in regard to
recreation facility closures and decreases to staffing and
programming. The turn to the PAL program and facilities
therefore signals the formation of an alternative to recre-
ation services administered by and through a city recre-
ation department.
On the one hand, the partnership model was de-
ployed in regard to both an “inter-agency” partnership
between recreation facilities and police staff, as well as
in relation to the primary funding of the PAL centers
through non-profit grants and private donations (“Po-
lice fill rec center void”, 1996). On the other hand, the
PAL centers also directly incorporated the rationale of
volunteerism–specifically in the context of decreased
funding and support for neighborhood-based recreation
services and facilities–by supporting volunteer efforts at
the centers through community engagement. Thus, the
initial strategy was to implement a PAL center in each of
the city’s 29 police districts over the next several years,
each of which would be funded entirely by grants and
donations, and staffed by at least one full-time police offi-
cer at each center, “with other roles filled by volunteers”
(“Police fill rec center void”, 1996).
However, aside from serving as another example of
the processes of privatization and devolution, the PALs
initiative also signals another intersection of Baltimore’s
public recreation governance and broader political and
social restructuring of the period. The implementation
of the PAL centers points to the development of another
aspect of privatization in the shift from the support and
funding of recreation services through government re-
sources and programs, to the provision and administra-
tion of recreation primarily through private, non-profit
and volunteer-based facilities and services. That is, this
analysis recognizes that the PAL centers and strategy rep-
resent the re-emergence of the “prevention” rationale
for urban recreation services, as the PAL approach was
based on the re-prioritizing of recreation as an especially
efficient deterrent for juvenile delinquency and general
community disassociation in city neighborhoods. While
the prevention rationale had been central to the ap-
proach towards urban recreation that centered on recre-
ation as a particular ‘intervention’ for and within ur-
ban communities, the structure and organization of the
recreation-based interventions of public-private recre-
ation in the 1990s differed from previous models. As
Hartmann (2001, p. 340) notes, the re-emergence of
recreation as “prevention” and as “intervention” in the
1990s was marked by two inter-related developments.
First, an increase in the scope, scale and number of
public-private partnerships within public recreation de-
partments and organizations; and second, the focus of
many of these partnerships on the perceived relation-
ships between neighborhood-based recreation programs
and community stability, safety, and social inclusion.
The partnership model was implemented in varying
degrees and towards different goals in relation to Bal-
timore’s recreation system throughout the 1980s and
1990s, with the PALs program being an example of a
multi-partner “partnership” that incorporated the pro-
cess of privatization by effectively removing recreation
services from the city-operated and funded department
and transferring this service to an arrangement of public,
private and non-profit organizations. However, the PAL
centers also demonstrate the relationship between the
partnership model and the re-emergence of the preven-
tion and interventionist rationales as a primary justifica-
tion for the support and funding of neighborhood-based
recreation programs, as the programwas organized with
the direct goal and purpose of reducing crime and ju-
venile delinquency, in particular in poorer communities.
Commissioner Frazier explained the PALs strategy was
appropriate for Baltimore as a city characterized by the
social polarization of “haves and have-nots”, and condi-
tions that were “a recipe for civil disorder,” as PAL cen-
ters were sites where the police could directly intervene
into the lives of children and adolescents and provide
an alternative to delinquent and criminal activities (as
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quoted in Hermann, 1996). In Frazier’s view, the PAL sites
were in a better position to offer recreation services as
the program depended on private and non-profit fund-
ing rather than the city budget, and the centers served
as opportunities to build “social capital” with youth and
within communities, constituting the police as not only
law enforcement but as “part of the social fabric of the
city” (Hermann, 1996). The PALs program thus signals
a re-articulation of the prevention and interventionist
rationales for recreation services in this period, uncou-
pled from the previous formation and approach of urban
recreation based in government funding and support,
and instead linked specifically to the partnership model
of public-private recreation. Further, the PALs qualify as
one aspect of “social problems industry” (Pitter & An-
drews, 1997) that emerged within the context of Ameri-
can cities in the 1990s, often in response to the descaling
and decline of public social services.
In light of the decline of public recreation services
and facilities, many communities, families and individu-
als instead were faced with two alternatives in regards
to recreation provision: the private, fee-based model
that was not accessible or affordable for all city resi-
dents; or, the “new brand of social welfare” in the form
of neighborhood-based recreation through private and
non-profit organizations and programming that were of-
ten premised on the rationale of recreation as a method
of preventing social ills (Pitter & Andrews, 1997, p. 86).
However, and in contrast to the ‘universalist’ approach
included within the formation of urban recreation that
sought to implement recreation programming for all city
residents, the “social problems” organizations of the
1990s also most often incorporated the rationales of
“prevention” and “intervention” into recreation program-
ming that was specifically organized towards children
and young adults, including the popular and controver-
sial “midnight basketball” programs thatwere developed
in many American cities during this period (Hartmann,
2001, p. 99). The PAL centers also were organized around
these ideas, as each center included a “midnight” or
evening basketball league for young adult males as part
of its programming, which wasmost often limited to chil-
dren and adolescents during the afternoon and evening
operating hours (Matthews, 1997a). As Hartmann (2001)
notes, these programsmay allow for forms of social inclu-
sion to develop between participants; however, and as
we emphasize in the following section, the PALs program
in Baltimore can be primarily recognized as a specific
form of urban neoliberalization. Following Kelly (2011),
neoliberal interventions involving sport and physical ac-
tivity often emphasize individual social behaviors and
“deficits”, and serve to discount structural inequalities in-
cluding the reduction of public services (p. 145).
3. Neoliberalization and the PALs in Baltimore
Following Peck and Tickell (2002), neoliberal policy
changes and initiatives are often interconnected to the
rolling-back of public services within urban spaces, and
yet are differentiated by particular rationales and logics.
Roll-back neoliberalization signaled the wider transfor-
mation of American urban governance in regard to the
erosion and dismantling of the Keynesian approach of
an earlier generation. Roll-out neoliberalization emerged
from this ideological shift, in the form of localized poli-
cies and initiatives that sought to construct an alterna-
tive form of social service delivery and provision, simul-
taneously addressing the “recurrent failures…of deregu-
lation and marketization” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 43)
strategies that unerringly arose. Thus, as Brenner and
Theodore (2002) illustrate, roll-out neoliberalization de-
veloped in relation to the “immanent contradictions and
crisis tendencies” of neoliberal policy itself, as cities in-
voked other neoliberal strategies in an attempt to en-
gage with the realities of disinvestment and privatization
(p. 34). The transformation of urban policy within roll-
back neoliberalization effectively created the break for
alternate approaches to urban governance, often in the
form of other neoliberal policy strategies that were en-
acted, or “rolled-out”, in order to address the shortcom-
ings and tensions of the rolling-back and dismantling of
a previous form of governance.
The incorporation and implementation of the PALs
program in Baltimore signals one aspect of the refig-
ured approach to recreation; established rationales for
recreation re-emerged, but were most often incorpo-
rated into the neoliberal processes of privatization, de-
volution and volunteerism, rather than as a premise
for funding and supporting a city-operated public recre-
ation agency. The PALs initiative represents a key ele-
ment and force in the restructuring of recreation cen-
ter policy within roll-out neoliberalization, as the de-
partment sought to supplement community and non-
profit partnershipswith a different type of recreation ser-
vice, aimed at the youth population in particular “prob-
lem” neighborhoods. Within the PAL program, city po-
lice officers were assigned to “active participation…as
role models, mentors, and caring adults for young peo-
ple,” and tasked with developing programming specifi-
cally designed for ages 7 through 17 that offered “a com-
bined focus on character development, academic enrich-
ment, arts and cultural activities, and athletics” (Subhas
& Chandra, 2004). Operating under the program’s motto,
“Giving kids in our toughest neighborhoods a chance to
succeed”, the PAL programsought to display “how lawen-
forcement personnel can have an impact on youth by fos-
tering academic excellence, civic responsibility, creativ-
ity, self-regulation, and social values” (Subhas & Chan-
dra, 2004). The initial implementation of the program
had immediate effects on the city’s recreation system, as
several of the first 10 PAL centers were recreation cen-
ters that had been closed or were threatened with im-
minent closure due to budget cuts (“Police fill rec center
void”, 1996).
The PALs program, like other private and non-profit
recreation programs focused on neighborhood-based
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crime prevention outcomes, had several advantages
over public recreation departments, primarily in regard
to the differences in funding and support. While PAL
centers attracted tax-exempt donations and grants from
local and regional non-profit foundations, the city pub-
lic recreation department was reliant on continually de-
creasing budgets and grant-funding opportunities. In July
1996, this “special advantage” meant that while the de-
partment was facing an additional $2 million budget
shortfall, and the possibility of further facility closures
and staff layoffs, the PALs program expanded to 11 sites
that were all former city recreation centers, and was re-
ceiving over $200,000 annually in donations and grant
funding for equipment and other facilities. This included
a former 7-Eleven on in northeast Baltimore that was of-
fered to the city for $1 by the non-profit MACHT founda-
tion, with the understanding that it would developed as
a PAL site (Hermann, 1996).
The growth and support of the PALs program, while
an example of the shifts to private and non-profit “part-
ners” in the place of public recreation provision, also
meant that the department was positioned as being in-
efficiently administered. Later that year–and in addition
to forewarning further budget cuts—Mayor Schmoke as-
sembled a 12-person “task force” to examine how the
department could address these inefficiencies, by imple-
menting increased user fees, the sale of parkland, and
conversion of vacant land towards generating revenue
that could help the department “pay more of its own
way” (Matthews, 1996). While the “task force” model
of recreation planning and policy would emerge again
in Baltimore nearly fifteen years later, Schmoke’s utiliza-
tion of this model signaled the necessity of alternative
solutions to public recreation governance within the un-
folding neoliberal climate. As the department’s attempts
to maintain a “universalist” mission and vision of public
recreation faltered (largely due to the reduction in the
levels of resources and funding that had made the mis-
sion possible), the corollary was a visibly broken recre-
ation system. As Schmoke indicated in announcing his
task force, if the current trends of “downsizing” and “con-
solidation of services” continued, the department would
also continue to “dwindle to a level that is unaccept-
able” (Matthews, 1996). Thus, along with being viewed
as a more viable alternative and better-equipped com-
petitor to the department’s recreation centers, PAL sites
were often used to explain the inefficiencies of the de-
partment and its inability to effectively restructure recre-
ation provision.
The deprioritization of public recreation as a city
agency and service provider throughout the 1980s and
1990s symbolized the “slow death” of public recreation
in the city, especially in comparison to the earlier gen-
eration of federally-subsidized support for recreation ini-
tiatives. Budget cuts and subsequent reductions to facili-
ties, staff and programs meant that by 2000, Baltimore’s
recreation centers had decreased from over 130 to less
than 70, over 80 of the city’s playgrounds were consid-
ered unsafe, and one maintenance worker was responsi-
ble for over 100 acres of city parks (Farrey, 2008, p. 232).
However, these changes also normalized neoliberalizing
strategies that proved impactful beyond the public recre-
ation realm. First, the highly visible inter-agency transfer
of recreation services from the city’s public recreation de-
partment to the PAL administration and budget encour-
aged the further devolution of public services in favor of
market alternatives (Tennberg, Vola, Espiritu, Schwenke
Fors, & Ejdemo, 2014). Second, modeled after a simi-
lar initiative in several other cities including New York
and Philadelphia, the PALs also serve as a form of what
Peck and Tickell (2002, p. 391) refer to as “interjurisdic-
tional policy transfer”, in which city governments share
and incorporate particular elements of neoliberal pol-
icy restructuring across different locations. In this mode,
the PAL program popularized the social problems indus-
try ethos, in which recreational opportunities were di-
rectly correlated with patterns of juvenile delinquency
and viewed as a tool that could address the effects and
consequences of social inequality. In seeking to adopt
some of the same principles in forming the PAL program
in Baltimore, Police Commissioner Frazier asserted that
the program sought to build “social capital” between of-
ficers and neighborhood youth, especially in the context
of the city’s socioeconomic environment of “haves and
have-nots” (Hermann, 1996). As a form of intervention-
ist policy that was effectively shared by multiple Amer-
ican cities, the PAL program therefore evidences a lack
of concern for local conditions, and instead emphasizes
a universal understanding of sport as a cure for a vari-
ety of social problems, rather than a focus on the par-
ticular forces that “might lead to desired outcomes for
some participants or some organizations in certain cir-
cumstances” (Coalter, 2010, p. 311).
In August 1997, the contrasting realities of the city’s
recreation centers and PAL centers—with recreation fa-
cilities facing annual budget reductions, and the possi-
bility of partial or full closures, while PAL centers contin-
ued to see increased private and non-profit funding and
political support—were evidenced in Mayor Schmoke’s
plan to expand the PAL program to another 10 centers,
all of which were operating as city recreation facilities at
the time of the plan’s announcement (Matthews, 1997b).
The decision to simultaneously and directly increase the
number of PALs, while reducing recreation centers, pro-
voked tensions regarding the roles and purposes of each
of the agencies involved, including criticism regarding
the role of staff and a lack of recreation training by po-
lice officers chargedwith operating the PAL centers. How-
ever, while a community volunteer at the Robert C. Mar-
shall center in west Baltimore (one of the centers desig-
nated for transfer to the PAL program) would describe
the plan as “one of the worst mistakes they can possibly
make”, the overriding rationale for the transfer of the 10
facilities was provided by the Mayor who stated it would
allow the city to “likely get through the year without clos-
ing any recreation centers” (Matthews, 1997b). The final
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plan would involve not only the immediate transfer of
the 10 centers, but also the establishing of at least one
PAL center in each of the city’s 29 police districts, as the
PAL program was again framed as a potential solution to
both the issues of a declining public recreation system
and the “problems based” context of many urban com-
munities (Subhas & Chandra, 2004). As a form of rolled-
out recreation, the devolution of services and facilities
from the city’s recreation department to the PALs pro-
gram serves as an example of a policy initiative designed
and deployed specifically towards addressing the condi-
tions of rolled-back urban neoliberalization.
Despite public support for the PALs in the interven-
ing years that saw the number of centers expanded to 27
locations by 2000, the program had long faced financial
struggles, and Mayor Martin O’Malley was subsequently
forced to close several centers in his first two years in of-
fice (Craig, 2000). Then in 2003, after the non-profit or-
ganization that operated the PAL centers announced that
they were no longer financially capable of managing the
program, O’Malley transferred control of the remaining
18 PALs to the police department (Wilber, 2003). There-
after, the program endured several years of financial
shortfalls. The citywide budget cuts in 2009 ultimately
made the operation of the PAL centers unfeasible for a
police department facing its own fiscal challenges. The
demise of the PAL program also had immediate conse-
quences for city recreation centers, as the transfer of fa-
cilities from the recreation department to the PALs pro-
gram that had occurred in the mid and late 1990s was
essentially reversed (Hermann, 2009). Further, in order
to meet budget expectations, the department planned
to close two recreation centers of its own, lay off several
staff positions, and reduce hours at several centers to “af-
ter school only”—the negative public reaction to these
planned closures and reductions in services was evident
in the dozens of letters and emails that the department
received, mostly in protest of the transfers and closures
of PAL centers (Hermann, 2009).
In response, the final implementation of the strat-
egy to address the future of neighborhood recreation
centers saw 12 of the PALs re-incorporated into the
system of city recreation centers, with a single center
closing and the others transferred to schools or non-
profit groups already operating in the facility (Hermann,
2009). However, the transfer of these facilities to the
control of the recreation department was not accompa-
nied by an increase to the operating budget of the de-
partment, meaning that recreation center staff and ser-
vices were tasked with an increased number of facili-
ties, on a still-shrinking budget. In many ways, the re-
addition of the former PAL sites to the network of recre-
ation centers represented a window into the city’s fis-
cal and administrative crisis: the reabsorption of facilities
and services into a system defined by years of declining
budgets and support only served to aggravate existing
problems in relation to recreation staffing, programming,
and maintenance.
4. Conclusions
An analysis of the PALs in Baltimore is also relevant to
wider discussions regarding the uneven development of
post-industrial cities, as well as the linkages between ur-
ban recreation and the goals and practices of social inclu-
sion (Collins, 2014). However, and as this article demon-
strates, the shifting relations between public recreation,
urban policy and planning, and issues of social inclusion
within Baltimore have special importance in the local
context; they have often emerged in the wake of tragic
events, including the violence following the assassina-
tion of Martin Luther King Jr. in 1968 and the death of
Baltimore resident Freddie Gray while in police custody
in 2015 (Efelbein, Nix & Hollowak, 2011; Reutter, 2015).
Within this context, the deprioritization of pub-
lic recreation—and, within the Baltimore context, the
demise of the PALs and continued disinvestment in
public recreation—were inevitabilities. The provision of
recreation for Baltimore’s continually underserved urban
populations markedly declined in the period post-2009,
a situation brought to the public’s attention in the after-
math of the 2015 violence in Baltimore ignited by the
unlawful killing of Freddie Gray, wherein some of the
city’s youth took to the streets in protest. While perhaps
not easily attributable to the demise of public recreation
within the city, many local politicians asserted this posi-
tion. For instance, city councilman Bill Henry condemned
the decades-long underfunding of public services aimed
at improving the lives of young black citizens, including
after-school programs, libraries, and recreation centers
(Reutter, 2015). In Henry’s words, the city’s youth no
longer attend recreation centers in the numbers they did
previously because “They are in awful shape because we
haven’t put any money in them in any serious amounts
for a quarter of a century” (quoted in Reutter, 2015).
Tellingly, Henry continued—underscoring the shift to-
ward carceral initiatives indicative of urban governance
within the state of exception of neoliberal austerity—
“the city has ‘purposely disinvested’ in young people ‘in
favor of investing in catching and caging them’” (quoted
in Reutter, 2015).
Many scholars have recognized the impact of urban
neoliberalization on communities of color, specifically in
relation to social inequality and economic opportunity
(Wacquant, 2009), as well as in regard to the connec-
tions between reduced social support and increased lev-
els of mass incarceration (Alexander, 2012). In his recent,
and vivid, contextualization of the Midnight Basketball
League, Hartmann (2016, p. 73) refers to this expression
of the social problems industry as an “example of neolib-
eral paternalism and the new carceral state, amicrocosm
of American neoliberal social policy and racialized politi-
cal culture.” As we have demonstrated within this brief
discussion, Baltimore’s PALs can be considered in pre-
cisely the same vein. They emerged and developed out
of the conflation of paternalistic and punitive attitudes
toward Baltimore’s underserved urban populace, which
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effectively demonized the very population they were at-
tempting to serve. Despite the unqestionably laudable
intentions of many of those working within the PAL pro-
gram, its very institutional structure and philosophy po-
sitioned the urban populace (rather than the broader
forces and relations responsible for challenging urban
conditions) as an a priori problem that needed to be ad-
dressed. In Baltimore and other American cities, issues
related to the social (dis)investement in young people of
color have been the primary concern of emergent polit-
ical and social movements, including Black Lives Matter,
and the incorporation of these issues into the activism of
community organizations holds some promise for a re-
structured approach to interventionist policies and pro-
grams. However, and as we have demonstrated, within
the context of the urban neoliberalization of the late
1990s and early 2000s, the Baltimore PAL program was
often rooted in assumptions regarding the role of recre-
ation in the process of improving the social inclusion of
spatially, social, and economically marginalized groups.
This analysis therefore suggests that the very real lim-
its of recreation policy need to be taken into account
when designing and implementing future interventions,
lest we fail to learn from the experiences–and thereby
repeat the mistakes–of the not too distant past.
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